



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

NAVAL SERVICE TRAINING COMMAND
2601A PAUL JONES STREET
GREAT LAKES, ILLINOIS 60088-2845

NSTCINST 5370.2
IG
30 Mar 09

NSTC INSTRUCTION 5370.2

From: Commander, Naval Service Training Command

Subj: NAVAL SERVICE TRAINING COMMAND HOTLINE PROGRAM

Ref: (a) [DoD Directive 7050.1](#)
(b) [SECNAVINST 5370.5B](#)
(c) NETCINST 5370.1A
(d) [SECNAVINST 5430.92B](#)
(e) [NAVINGEN Investigations Manual](#)
(f) [DoD Directive 7050.06](#)
(g) [SECNAV Manual M-5210.1](#)
(h) [SECNAVINST 5210.16](#)

Encl: (1) [Sample Hotline Investigative Report](#)
(2) [NSTC Hotline Flowchart](#)
(3) [NSTC IG Hotline Complaint Form](#)

1. Purpose. To implement the provisions of references (a) through (d) by establishing policies and procedures for the management, coordination, and operation of the Hotline Program within Naval Service Training Command (NSTC).

2. Applicability. Provisions of this directive are applicable to all Department of the Navy (DoN) active duty and reserve military personnel and civilian employees within NSTC activities.

3. Background

a. References (a) through (c) provide information on the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of the Navy (DoN) and Naval Education and Training Command (NETC) Hotline programs. Reference (d) provides information regarding the DoN policy to eliminate fraud, waste, and related improprieties from the DoN. This instruction amplifies references (a) through (d) and assigns responsibilities for implementing these programs within NSTC activities.

b. Commander, NSTC (CNSTC) is committed to an active, aggressive program directed toward the elimination of fraud, waste, and mismanagement within NSTC. All NSTC activities shall

actively support this program through positive command attention and strict adherence to applicable directives.

c. Command Evaluation, audit, inspection, and investigative components within NSTC will execute their assigned responsibilities to detect, deter, and eliminate fraud, waste, mismanagement, and related improprieties occurring within the DoN.

4. Policy

a. General

(1) The policy of the DoN is to manage effectively all resources entrusted to its care. All personnel shall be vigilant to the possibility of illegal or improper acts and shall report such illegal or improper acts to proper authorities. Reference (d) defines "proper authority" as "the immediate superior of the person submitting the report, his/her commander or commanding officer, the immediate supervisor of his/her commander or commanding officer if either are apparently implicated, an appropriate Inspector General (IG), or an agent of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS)."

(2) The Hotline Program represents an important tool used to identify and correct fraud, waste, mismanagement, and related improprieties. Prompt, responsive, and impartial action will be taken to examine substantive allegations, to pursue corrective measures per applicable laws, regulations, and directives, and to report the result of such inquiries via the chain of command.

(3) Hotline complaints referred to NSTC will be investigated by NSTC IG staff personnel. NSTC IG will provide feedback to the appropriate Immediate Superior in Command.

(4) Reference (e) sets forth guidelines for the conduct of investigations. All NSTC activities shall use this manual as a guide for hotline investigations conducted under this program.

(5) Reference (f) sets forth policy and responsibility for military whistleblower protection. Commands receiving a military whistleblower complaint shall immediately notify the NETC IG via NSTC IG and provide a copy of the complaint.

b. Investigative Standards. Inquiries and investigations shall be conducted in an independent and professional manner without undue command influence, pressure, or fear of reprisal. All non-frivolous substantive allegations of improper conduct shall be thoroughly and impartially investigated and reported.

(1) Independence. Perceptions generated by the handling of hotline investigations greatly influence the success of the program. All allegations shall be examined by officials outside and independent of the operation in which the complaint allegedly occurred. Individuals assigned to perform an investigation must be free, in fact and appearance, from any impairment of objectivity and impartiality. The investigator must meet basic selection criteria, e.g., sufficient seniority, maturity, professional experience, and independence in the matter under inquiry, as if appointed for a JAGMAN investigation. The assistance of others with special professional or technical skills may be used when warranted.

(2) Accountability. Commanding officers and supervisors have the duty to hold subordinates accountable for their actions and to correct systemic faults. The investigation must provide them with the information necessary to exercise that responsibility effectively. If the investigation proves (or gives the perception) of wrongdoing, the investigative report should contain recommendations to be considered by the deciding official.

(3) Completeness. Hotline investigative reports must be thorough and address all relevant aspects of the investigation. The report must be logically organized, accurate, clear and concise. It must not raise unanswered questions or leave matters open to question or misinterpretation. If additional allegations or discoveries, whether related to the original complaint or not, surface during the investigation, they shall be addressed in the hotline investigative report. Systemic weaknesses or management problems disclosed during the investigation must be reported. Enclosure (1) provides the format to be used for hotline investigative reports.

(4) Timeliness. Investigations shall be completed expeditiously. NSTC IG will assign a due date for receipt of the investigative report; normally, the response time is 60 calendar days. When an investigator is assigned, the hotline is to be their primary duty until the investigation is complete and

properly reported. When some form of action is recommended in the investigative report, the investigator will ensure the subject command under investigation submits a report of completed action to NSTC IG no later than 15 calendar days after the investigative report is forwarded to NSTC. The individual tasked with the investigation shall ensure established due dates are met. A request for an extension may be submitted to NSTC IG should valid circumstances preclude meeting the assigned due date. Requests must be submitted in writing by e-mail and contain the following:

(a) Status of investigation (provide the results of investigation to date (summary)).

(b) Reason for delay in completing investigation or submitting investigative report.

(c) Expected date report will be provided to NSTC.

(d) Other comments as appropriate.

(5) Confidentiality. Under the Hotline Program, complainants are assured confidentiality to the greatest degree possible to encourage full disclosure of information without fear of reprisal. However, complainants are encouraged to identify themselves so that additional facts can be obtained from them if necessary and feedback from the results of the investigation can be provided to them. In order to protect to the maximum extent possible the identity of hotline complainants who have been granted confidentiality, NSTC IG shall be the point of contact when such identity is required by the investigator assigned. In those instances where the source is disclosed, the identity shall be protected to the utmost of the investigator's capabilities.

c. Certification Requirements

(1) Certified investigators shall, to the maximum extent possible, conduct all investigations tasked by NSTC. All personnel who have investigative duties, which include reviewing investigations, shall be certified as DoN investigators.

(2) Initial certification of NSTC personnel will be issued by the NETC IG upon completion of the on-line investigator's course and Naval Inspector General (NAVINGEN)

in-resident investigations course. All investigators must complete the NAVINSGEN Investigation School within six months of assignment.

(3) Assignment of a noncertified individual as a hotline investigator, for a single case, must be approved by NETC IG via NSTC IG. Proof of completion of the on-line investigator's course must be submitted to the NETC IG via NSTC IG. Prior to the start of the investigation, NSTC IG shall submit the name of the individual being tasked with the investigation to NETC (N00G) for approval/certification. Approval is discretionary. The NETC IG will grant interim certification when it is deemed that the intended investigator, by demeanor, experience, and position, is capable of conducting a professional investigation and producing a report that satisfies the standards of independence, accountability, completeness, and timeliness.

(4) All investigators (except interim certified personnel conducting one-time investigations) must complete annual training requirements as set forth in reference (b), to maintain their certification.

(5) The NAVINSGEN on-line Hotline Investigator Certification will be used to certify IGs, investigators, and one-time investigators.

(6) Personnel desiring to attend the NAVINSGEN three-day Investigator's Course must submit their request to NETC (N00G) via NSTC IG to obtain a quota. Proof of completion of the on-line investigator's course must accompany the request.

d. Additional Provisions

(1) The chain of command for all hotline investigative reports is the investigator, NSTC IG, Chief of Staff (COS), and CNSTC.

(2) CNSTC or COS will sign all cover letters forwarding hotline investigative reports. All investigative reports and/or letter reports of Commanding Officers in the paygrade of O-6 shall have a Staff Judge Advocate legal review and a flag officer endorsement. Include in the cover letter a statement of concurrence/non-concurrence with the conclusions and

recommendations of the investigating official. NSTC IG may sign subsequent correspondence related to corrective action "By direction."

(3) All correspondence related to hotline complaints shall be considered "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY" and appropriate safeguards employed. Reports shall be forwarded to NETC IG via NSTC IG by digitally signed and encrypted message email. The original reports shall be sent to NETC in double sealed envelopes with proper markings for "attention to" and "eyes only" of the NETC IG.

(4) All working papers and files resulting from the inquiry into the hotline complaint shall be retained by NSTC IG. All working papers and files will be sent to NSTC IG in double sealed envelopes with proper markings for "attention to" and "eyes only" of the NSTC IG. As stated in reference (g), NAVINSGEN investigations must be maintained permanently, although they may be sent to a federal records center for storage. Files shall be retained by NSTC for three (3) years after completion of an investigation.

(5) NSTC IG staff personnel shall maintain the electronic database Naval Inspector General Hotline Tracking System (NIGHTS) to manage investigative files.

(6) It is important to ensure officials, who rely on IG investigations to hold personnel accountable, understand the significance of the findings, and the limitations, of the reports of investigations provided. Note to Reviewing Authority (enclosure (3)) of reference (c) furthers the IG mission by providing advice and assistance to decision makers, in as fair and straightforward a manner as possible. Enclosure (3) of reference (c) provides "truth in advertising," stating what the investigation is and is not, and what actions (and due process protections) still need to be taken. Enclosure (3) of reference (c) highlights that the findings of an investigation are the IG and/or investigator's opinions based on the preponderance of the evidence, and the subject of the investigation may not have had an opportunity to formally rebut adverse findings. All investigators are encouraged to include the "Note to Reviewing Authority" as an enclosure in the investigative report.

(7) Commands shall provide the widest dissemination of the hotline program within their areas of responsibility. To

assist in this effort, the following hotline numbers and addresses are provided:

(a) NSTC: (collect calls are not accepted)

1. During working hours (0800-1730 CST)
792-2258/86 DSN
(847) 688-2258/86 Commercial
2. 24-Hour Answering Machine
792-2310 DSN
(847) 688-2310 Commercial

Commander, Naval Service Training Command
Inspector General (IG)
2601A Paul Jones Street
Great Lakes, IL 60088-2845

(b) NETC: (collect calls are not accepted)

1. During working hours (0730-1630 CST)
922-4838 DSN
(850) 452-4838 Commercial
2. 24-Hour Answering Machine
922-3477 DSN
(850) 452-3477 Commercial

Email: PNSC_NETCIGHotlines@navy.mil

Web Site: www.netc.navy.mil/cnet/ig/index.html

Commander, Naval Education and Training Command
Inspector General (N00G)
250 Dallas Street
Pensacola, FL 32508-5220

(c) Navy Hotline

1-800-522-3451 Toll Free
288-6743 DSN
(202) 433-6743 Washington Area

Email: NAVIGHotlines@navy.mil

Web Site: www.ig.navy.mil

Office of the Naval Inspector General
1254 Ninth Street, S.E.
Building 172
Washington, DC 20374-5006

(d) DoD Hotline

1-800-424-9098 Toll Free
664-8569 DSN
(703) 604-8569 Commercial

Email: hotline@dodig.osd.mil

Web Site: www.dodig.osd.mil/hotline

Defense Hotline
The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1900

(8) Hotline posters will be displayed in command spaces for the information of military and civilian personnel.

5. Action

a. NSTC IG

(1) Maintain overall cognizance of the NSTC Hotline Program.

(2) Investigate or inquire into reported matters of fraud, waste, mismanagement, and related improprieties within NSTC. [Enclosure \(2\)](#) is the process flowchart to be followed by NSTC investigators conducting hotline investigations. [Enclosure \(3\)](#) is the NSTC IG Hotline Complaint Form (NSTC 5370/101) to be used for conducting hotline investigations.

(3) Monitor status of significant cases of fraud, waste, and related improprieties reported within NSTC and coordinate with external agencies as appropriate.

(4) As required, forward to NETC IG requests for certification to conduct hotline investigations and maintain a master listing of certified investigators.

(5) Coordinate with NETC IG on annual recertification training.

b. Commanding Officers, Department Heads and Supervisors

(1) Comply with the requirements of this instruction.

(2) Stress the positive aspects of stewardship, and faith and trust of the American citizens in military and civilian government employees.

(3) Set a personal example in regard to responsibility, accountability, and conduct, and insist on similar behavior from those placed in positions of authority.

(4) Make optimum use of internal communication tools and face-to-face discussions, e.g., Captain's Calls, Plan of the Week, and Plan of the Day, to reinforce personal commitment to eliminating fraud, waste, mismanagement, and related improprieties.

(5) Establish and use Command Evaluation and Managers' Internal Control Programs in areas most susceptible to fraud, waste, and related improprieties.

(6) Use NCIS to conduct investigations into potential criminal offenses.

(7) Ensure swift and appropriate corrective action, administrative and/or disciplinary, is taken in cases where wrongdoing has been substantiated.

(8) Report all cases of suspected misconduct involving O5s, GS/GM-13s/NSPS equivalent, or above to NETC IG via NSTC IG.

6. Reports. Per reference (h), reports referred to in this instruction are exempt from reports control.

7. Forms. To obtain NSTC 5370/101 (01-09), Naval Service Training Command Inspector General Hotline Complaint Form, contact Ms. Judith Goldsmith, NSTC IG, at (847) 688-2258 or via electronic mail at judith.goldsmith1@navy.mil.



C. S. SHARPE

Distribution: (NSTCINST 5216.1B)
List 4

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Sample Investigative Report (IR)

**DOD/NAVY HOTLINE 20030001 INVESTIGATIVE REPORT
1 August 2003**

1. Investigators and Identifying Information and Location of Working Papers

a. Investigators and Identifying Information

(1) Ms. Jean Cook, GS-13, Investigator, Office of the Inspector General, Commander, Naval Air Systems Command (COMNAVAIRSYSCOM), Tel: (111) 111-1111 or DSN 288-1111, e-mail: jcook@navair.navy.mil.

(2) Mr. John Hays, GS-12, Investigator, Office of the Inspector General, COMNAVAIRSYSCOM, Tel: (111) 111-8912 or DSN 288-8912, e-mail: jhays@navair.navy.mil.

b. Location of working papers. COMNAVAIRSYSCOM, Office of the Inspector General, Attn: AIR-00G, 22145 Arnold Circle, Unit #7, Bldg 404, Suite 100, Patuxent River, MD 20670-1541

2. Background and Summary

a. Hotline Control Number, Dates of Receipt, and Tasking Dates

(1) Department of Defense (DoD) Hotline Complaint (HLC) 20030001 - DoD received the complaint on 10 May 2003 and tasked Naval Inspector General (NAVINSGEN) on 30 May 2003.

(2) NAVINSGEN received the complaint on 4 June 2003 and tasked COMNAVAIRSYSCOM on 8 June 2003.

(3) COMNAVAIRSYSCOM received the NAVINSGEN tasking letter and complaint on 12 June 2003 and tasked to the IO on 20 June 2003.

(4) IO received the case on 20 June 2003, and opened the investigation.

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Enclosure (1)

b. Summary of Complaint. The complainant alleged three COMNAVAIRSYSCOM employees, Ms. Sylvia Chase, Ms. Paula Collins and Ms. Marie Powell, were on temporary duty (TDY) from 1-5 March 2003 while attending a conference in San Diego, California. The complainant alleged that Ms. Chase did not attend the afternoon conference session on 3 March 2003 and did not return to the conference on 4 March 2003. The caller also alleged that Ms. Chase returned to Reagan-National Airport, Washington, D.C., vice Dulles Airport, as scheduled, and did not pay the additional costs for the flight change. Our review of the complaint and other documents determined the allegations addressed in this report are appropriate for investigation.

c. Additional Information (Optional). The Naval Inspector General Hotline Tracking System (NIGHTS) and NAVAIRSYSCOM database did not reveal any previous substantiated allegations against Ms. Chase.

d. Summary of the Outcome of Investigation. We substantiated one allegation against Ms. Sylvia Chase. Based on the evidence, we concluded Ms. Chase did not attend the afternoon session of the C4I Conference on 3 March and did not attend the conference on 4 March. We are forwarding the investigation recommending the chain of command take appropriate action to hold Ms. Chase accountable for misusing her official time in violation of Joint Ethics Regulation (JER) § 2635.705 while at the conference.

3. First allegation. That Ms. Sylvia Chase improperly abused her official time by not attending a working group she was required to attend on the afternoon of 3 March 2003, and an all day working group on 4 March 2003, in violation of DoD Instruction 5500.7-R, Joint Ethics Regulation (JER), Chapter 2 § 2635.705, Use of Official Time. Substantiated.

a. Facts

(1) JER § 2635.705 states that an employee shall use official time in an honest effort to perform official duties.

(2) Mr. Taylor Rutkowski, Ms. Chase's supervisor, authorized Temporary Duty orders for her to travel on 1 March

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2003 and attend the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR), Command Communication, Control, Capture and Intelligence (C4I) conference in San Diego, California, held from 2-4 March, and to return to her residence on 5 March 2003.

(3) The Conference Schedule of Events and Presentations listed Ms. Chase as a panel participant for the C4I Network Users' Working Group at 1300 on 3 March 2003. She was also scheduled to be a member of the Network Users' Working Group all day on 4 March 2003.

(4) Mr. Randall Lopez, the Conference Chairperson and Panel Moderator for the C4I Network Users' Working Group, stated Ms. Chase was scheduled to be a panelist on his working group on 3 March 2003 beginning at 1300. He stated she was not seated on the panel during the entire afternoon session, as scheduled. Mr. Lopez stated Ms. Chase called him Wednesday evening to let him know she was ill and apologized for not attending the working group. Mr. Lopez stated Ms. Chase also told him she would not be attending the Thursday working group due to illness.

(5) Ms. Collins stated that around 1200 on Wednesday, 3 March 2003, Ms. Sylvia Chase drove her to Rio Grande, a nearby restaurant, for lunch where they met Ms. Chase's friend, Mr. Roy Martin. She recalled that she, Ms. Chase, and Mr. Martin ordered margaritas and that Ms. Chase and Mr. Martin ordered a second round of margaritas. She stated that she saw Mr. Toti Papas and Ms. Armandina Sanchez, at the restaurant and asked if she could ride back with them so she could make some phone calls before the afternoon session began. She stated Ms. Chase did not sit on the working group panel on the afternoon of 3 March. She stated she became concerned about her so she called her Wednesday evening, but she did not answer the telephone. Ms. Collins stated she and Ms. Chase were in the same working group on 4 March, but she did not see her there either.

(6) Ms. Joyce Cranston, a conference participant, stated she sat next to the door during the C4I Network Users' Working Group on the afternoon of 3 March 2003. She was quite certain that Ms. Chase was not seated on the panel. She stated she did not see her enter the room at any time during the afternoon

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session on 3 March. Ms. Cranston also stated Ms. Chase did not attend the working group on Thursday, 4 March.

(7) Mr. Toti Papas, a conference attendee, stated he attended the Wednesday, 3 March and the 4 March, Network Users' Working Group and that Ms. Chase was not present at either.

(8) Ms. Powell stated she was not a member of the Network Users' Group so she did not know whether or not Ms. Chase attended either the 3 March or the 4 March sessions. Ms. Powell recollected Ms. Collins asked her on Wednesday evening at dinner whether or not she had seen Ms. Chase and that she seemed concerned about her.

(9) Ms. Armandina Sanchez stated she went to lunch with Mr. Toti Papas at the Rio Grande on 3 March 2003 around noon. She stated she noticed Ms. Chase having lunch with a man and Ms. Collins and that Ms. Chase was talking loudly. Ms. Sanchez stated she saw the waitress bring margaritas to Ms. Chase's table. Ms. Sanchez recalled Ms. Collins asking for a ride to the conference. She stated Ms. Collins rode back with them. Ms. Sanchez remembers that Ms. Chase was still seated at her table when she, Mr. Papas, and Ms. Collins left the restaurant. Ms. Sanchez stated she was in a different working group located in a different area of the Center on 3 March and 4 March and that she did not see Ms. Chase on either day at the Conference.

(10) Ms. Chase, stated she had lunch on 3 March 2003 with Ms. Collins and with Mr. Martin, a friend, who lived in the local area. She stated she became extremely ill after lunch and Mr. Martin took her to the emergency room. Ms. Chase stated she had gotten food poisoning from something she ate at the Rio Grande. She stated she was so sick that she could not attend the afternoon session on 3 March. She stated she called Mr. Lopez to explain why she did not come on Wednesday and told him she would not be at the session on Thursday. She stated she forgot to call her supervisor in Washington DC to let him know that she was sick and unable to attend either working group. She stated that she forgot to submit a "Request for Leave" for the sick leave she took while she was in San Diego at the conference.

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(11) Mr. Taylor Rutkowski, Ms. Chase's supervisor, stated that he directed her to be a panelist for the C4I Network Users' Working Group during the afternoon session on 3 March 2003 at 1300. Mr. Rutkowski stated Ms. Chase did not inform him when she returned from the conference that she did not sit on the panel, attend the Network Users' Working Group on 3 March, or attend the working group on 4 March 2003. Mr. Rutkowski did not recall Ms. Chase submitting a leave slip for her absence on those days.

(12) The COMNAVAIRSYSCOM time and attendance records do not show that Ms. Chase submitted a "Request for Leave" for 3 March or 4 March 2003.

(13) Mr. Roy Martin, a civilian (non-government) friend, had lunch with Ms. Chase and Ms. Collins on 3 March 2003. He declined to be interviewed.

b. Analysis, discussion, conclusion

(1) Ms. Chase was on official government orders to attend the C4I Conference from 1 to 5 March 2003 and her supervisor had directed her to participate in the working groups on 3 and 4 March.

(2) Mr. Lopez, Ms. Collins, Mr. Papas, and Ms. Cranston testified Ms. Chase was not seated on the panel during the Network Users' working group on the afternoon of 3 March.

(3) Mr. Lopez, Ms. Collins, Mr. Papas and Ms. Cranston testified Ms. Chase did not attend the Network Users' Working Group on 4 March.

(4) According to Ms. Chase, she got sick during lunch at the Rio Grande restaurant on Wednesday, 3 March, and was unable to return to the conference on Wednesday afternoon and Thursday. Although she called Mr. Lopez, the Conference Chairperson, to let him know why she was not at the working group and to tell him she would not attend the Thursday session, she did not tell her supervisor, Mr. Rutkowski, or submit a leave request for those days.

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(5) Ms. Chase did not use her official time in accordance with JER § 2635.705. She did not sit on the panel at the Network Users' Working Group on the afternoon of 3 March, as scheduled, she did not attend the working group on Thursday, 4 March, and she did not submit a leave request to account for her failure to perform official duties during official time. Based on this evidence, we substantiated the allegation.

c. Recommendations. Take appropriate administrative action to hold Ms. Chase accountable.

d. Disposition. Forwarded to higher authority for appropriate administrative and/or corrective action.

4. Second allegation. That Ms. Sylvia Chase returned from San Diego to Reagan-National Airport vice Dulles Airport and incurred an additional cost for the flight change and fare increase at government expense, for which she improperly claimed reimbursement on her travel voucher dated 7 March 2003, in violation of 2 JTR, Joint Travel Regulations. Unsubstantiated.

a. Facts

(1) 2 JTR § C2001A under subsection, Selecting Method of Transportation to be Used, states, in part: "Except as noted herein, the use of discount fares offered by contract air carriers between certain cities (city-pairs) is advantageous to the Government and is mandatory for authorized air travel between those city-pairs. If a contract city-pair fare is not available, the least expensive unrestricted fare ... should be used."

(2) 2 JTR § C2001A under subsection, Traveler's Cost Liability When Selected Method not Used, states, in part: "The employee shall use the method of transportation administratively authorized/approved by the DoD component concerned as most advantageous to the Government. Any additional cost resulting from the use of a method of transportation other than specifically authorized/approved, or required by regulation, e.g., contract air service, is the employee's responsibility."

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(3) The San Diego to Dulles Airport flight is a direct, five and one-half hour, government-contract flight. The San Diego to Reagan-National Airport flight is a seven-hour, non-government-contract flight with an en route stop in Chicago.

(4) Ms. Chase stated she changed her reservation for the return flight from Dulles Airport to Reagan-National because it was closer to her home in Alexandria, Virginia. She stated she preferred to use Reagan-National because she would not have to have someone pick her up at the Dulles Airport or take a long taxi ride to her home, which would take about 45 minutes. She stated she was willing to pay the extra amount for the convenience of returning to Reagan-National Airport. She stated she called the SATO Help Desk to change her flight. Ms. Chase stated she paid the \$50.00 penalty fee to change the reservation and the \$65.00 fare increase with her personal credit card. She stated she did not include a request for reimbursement on her travel claim since she paid the penalty fee and fare increase.

(5) Ms. Lisa Ponds, SATO representative, stated that in accordance with 2 JTR, they are required to book employees on government TDY using government contract flights, if available, via the closest servicing airports. Based on this regulation, SATO was required to route Ms. Chase from San Diego to Dulles Airport. Ms. Ponds stated that an employee could elect to use another flight if they paid the additional increased fare, did not charge the government, or if the command authorized other travel arrangements on the orders.

(6) Mr. Taylor Rutkowski, Ms. Chase's supervisor stated he authorized Ms. Chase to vary her travel arrangements on the orders dated 23 February 2003. He further stated he had discussed this with Ms. Chase and that she had told him she "took care of" the additional fees.

(7) Review of Ms. Chase's travel claim confirmed that she did not request reimbursement for the additional fees she incurred as a result of the flight change.

b. Analysis, discussion, conclusion

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(1) Ms. Chase changed her return flight from the government contract flight to the non-contract flight because it was closer to her home; knowing her supervisor gave her the authority to change the orders and she was responsible for any additional fees. In accordance with 2 JTR § C2001A, she was authorized to make the change if she paid the additional penalty fee and fare increase.

(2) Mr. Rutkowski, Ms. Chase's supervisor, authorized her to vary her travel arrangements on the travel orders. Ms. Chase paid the penalty fee and fare increase for her travel from San Diego to Reagan-National Airport using her personal credit card and did not claim the additional expenses on her 7 March 2003 travel voucher. Based on this evidence, the allegation is unsubstantiated.

c. Recommendations. None.

d. Disposition. None.

5. Interviews and Documents

a. Interviews conducted. (All interviews conducted in person unless otherwise noted.)

(1) Ms. Sylvia Chase (subject), COMNAVAIRSYSCOM Deputy Program Manager, PMA 277, GS-14;

(2) Ms. Paula Collins (witness), COMNAVAIRSYSCOM Level II Team Leader, PMA 277, GS-13;

(3) Ms. Marie Powell (witness) COMNAVAIRSYSCOM Program Analyst, PMA 277, GS-11;

(4) Mr. Taylor Rutkowski (witness), COMNAVAIRSYSCOM Program Manager, PMA 277;

(5) Mr. Randall Lopez (witness), Conference Chairperson and Panel Moderator (Telephone Interview);

(6) Ms. Armandina Sanchez (witness), Conference Attendee;

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(7) Mr. Toti Papas (witness), Conference Attendee;

(8) Ms. Joyce Cranston (witness), Conference Attendee;
(Telephone Interview); and

(9) Ms. Lisa Ponds, Scheduled Airlines Travel Office
(SATO).

b. Documents reviewed

(1) Joint Travel Regulations, Volume 2 (2 JTR) §§
C2001A;

(2) Joint Ethics Regulation (JER), Chapter 2 § 2635.705;

(3) Ms. Sylvia Chase's travel order (#67895) dated 23
February 2003 and related travel voucher dated 7 March 2003,
receipts/attachments and Defense Finance and Accounting System
(DFAS) Travel Voucher Summary;

(4) COMNAVAIRSYSCOM March 2003 time and attendance;

(5) List of Conference attendees;

(6) Conference Schedule of Events and Presentations; and

(7) Privacy Act statement.

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Hotline Complaint (HLC) Process


Purpose: Process by which Naval Service Training Command (NSTC) Inspector General (IG) Investigates HLCs

Process Owner Code: IG, Phone: (847) 688-2258 (DSN 792)

Revised: May 2008

*** Key Metric**

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NAVAL SERVICE TRAINING COMMAND INSPECTOR GENERAL HOTLINE COMPLAINT FORM				
1. Do you wish to remain anonymous? <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <i>If yes, do not identify yourself below.</i>				
2. If no, do you want confidentiality? <input type="checkbox"/> No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <i>If yes, identify yourself below. We will not release your name without your consent</i>				
3. Are you willing to be interviewed? <input type="checkbox"/> No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes				
Contact Information				
First Name Jane	Last Name Dow	Street Address 123 Military Drive		
Home Phone (123) 456-7890	Work Phone (123) 567-8901	City Orlando	State FL	Zip 32835
Email Address jane.dow@military.mil		Country USA		
Allegation Information				
1. Who is involved? <i>Include everyone's first and last names, rank/pay grade, and duty station/place of employment.</i> Subject(s): Who performed the wrong doing? LT Robert Neversail, NSTC SN Donald Vessel, NSTC Mrs. Minnie Mouse, YC2 NSTC Witness(es): Who are the witnesses? ENS Winnie Duffy LNC Judy Garland				
2. What did the subject(s) do or fail to do that was wrong? Abused TAD/TDY Travel				
3. What rule, regulation or law do you think the subject(s) violated? DoD 5500.7-R, JER MILPERSMAN, Chapter 68				

NAVAL SERVICE TRAINING COMMAND
INSPECTOR GENERAL HOTLINE COMPLAINT FORM (continued)

4. When did the incident occur? *Provide dates and times or "Early 2002," etc.*
On or about 31 July 2008 to the present.

5. Where did the incident take place? *What location, command etc.?*
London, England; Dominican Republic; and Orlando, FL.

6. Why do you think the incident took place?
They simply used military travel funds for leisure travel. They feel the rules and regulations do not apply to them.

7. How have you tried to resolve the problem?
Have you contacted your chain of command? Have you contacted your local Inspector General? Have you tried to resolve your complaint using an established process such as Bureau of Corrections of Naval Records, Informal Resolution System, EO/EEO or legal system?
I contacted the members' chain of command, LCDR Supply Office and Mrs. A. T. Money, YC3, on nine occasions (14 August 2008, 3 September 2008, 28 September 2008, 15 October 2008, 31 October 2008, 25 November 2008, 15 December 2008, 30 December 2008, and 10 January 2009). To date, the chain of command has not taken any action on the matter.

8. What do you want the IG to do?
Investigate the matter.

9. Additional information you wish to provide:
None.

SAMPLE